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Competitive, but too small  
Productivity and entry-exit determinants in European 
business services
Henk Kox#), George van Leeuwen&) and Henry van der Wiel*) 
Abstract:
The paper investigates whether scale effects, market structure, and regulation determine the poor 
productivity performance of the European business services industry. We apply parametric and 
nonparametric methods to estimate the productivity frontier and subsequently explain the distance of firms 
to the productivity frontier by market characteristics, entry- and exit dynamics and national regulation. The 
frontier is assessed using detailed industry data panel for 13 EU countries. Our estimates suggest that most 
scale advantages are exhausted after reaching a size of 20 employees. This scale inefficiency is persistent 
over time and points to weak competitive selection. Market and regulation characteristics explain the 
persistence of X-inefficiency (sub-optimal productivity relative to the industry frontier). More entry and exit 
are favourable for productivity performance, while higher market concentration works out negatively. 
Regulatory differences also appear to explain part of the business services' productivity performance. In 
particular regulation-caused exit and labour reallocation costs have significant and large negative impacts
on the process of competitive selection and hence on productivity performance. Overall we find that the 
most efficient scale in business services is close to 20 employees and that scale inefficiencies show a hump-
shape pattern with strong potential scale economies for the smallest firms and diseconomies of scale for the 
largest firms. The smallest firms operate under competitive conditions, but they are too small to be efficient. 
And since this conclusion holds for about 95 out of every 100 European business services firms, this factor 
weighs heavily for the overall productivity performance of this industry.
Key words: productivity; frontier models; scale efficiency; market selection; entry-exit; regulation; EU; 
business services
JEL codes: L1, L5, D2, L8
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1. Introduction
Business services is an industry that accounts for 11 per cent of total market-sector employment in the 
European Union (EU). The business services industry itself has a stagnating productivity growth. Between 
1979 and 2003, its annual productivity growth amounted to 0.3 per cent. This compares badly with the 1.6 
per cent average productivity growth in the EU countries.1 Business services form a large share of total 
intermediary inputs in the EU countries, so its weak productivity-growth record is no good news for the rest 
of the European economy. The sector is at risk of becoming a drag on average productivity growth in the 
EU, with the so-called Baumol Disease lurking around.
This paper investigates the structural causes of the low productivity performance in the European business 
services industry. In particular, we analyse how the interaction of scale effects, market structure, entry-exit 
selection, and regulation affect the productivity performance of this industry.
Earlier research by Barone et al. (2008) finds that a lack of production efficiency in professional services 
has significant negative effects on the production efficiency of downstream industries, an effect that even 
holds for a restricted sample of high-income countries. The effect on aggregate growth may however be 
mitigated in several ways. Oulton (2001) has shown that the comprehensive contribution of business 
services to aggregate growth may still be positive, when the price of business services keeps falling 
compared to the wages in the outsourcing industries. This process works only if the business services 
industry passes on its productivity gains (however small they may be) to their clients in the form of lower 
prices. A further mitigating effect is the role of IT and other business services for the innovation process in 
the rest of the economy. Several authors show that the business services industry generates positive 
technology spillovers for the rest of the economy (Van Leeuwen 2008; Hempell et al. 2002; Antonelli 
1999). Others argue that despite a virtual own productivity stagnation, business services may still positively 
contribute to aggregate growth if the extent of its innovation spillovers to other sectors of the economy is 
maintained (Kox, 2004; Baker et al., 2008). That such positive technological spillovers to the rest of the 
economy exist is shown empirically by Camacho and Rodriguez (2007) and Guerrieri (2005). 
The contribution of our paper to the literature is that we explain the productivity performance of European 
business services from structural factors like market structure, scale (dis-)economies, entry- and exit 
dynamics and national regulation. We proceed in two steps. In the first step we estimate a productivity 
frontier per sub-sector and size class by parametric and nonparametric methods, using a data panel for 
thirteen EU countries. In a next step we explain the productivity distance of business services firms to the 
 Rubalcaba et al. (2007) show that the productivity growth stagnation in business services cannot be ascribed to 
technologically backward branches: the productivity-growth record hardly differs between knowledge-intensive 
business services with high human-capital content and the more standardised business services that employ lots of 
less-skilled labour.
productivity frontier by including in our model structural determinants of scale efficiency, market structure, 
entry- and exit dynamics and national regulatory features. 
Our main findings are the following. The smallest size class that represents more than 90 per cent 
of all business services firms in the EU and about one-third of total employment appears to be very 
competitive. Small firms with 1-9 workers have tiny market shares and they appear to use very similar 
technologies as larger firms. However, compared to the most efficient size class (50-249 workers) these 
firms appear to have a huge scale inefficiency that negatively affects their productivity performance. The
scale inefficiency pattern is persistent over time, which points to weak competitive selection. We find that 
the persistence of sub-optimal productivity relative to the industry frontier is explained by market 
characteristics and national regulation characteristics. A higher regulation intensity appears to lower 
productivity performance. More market entry and exit of firms correlates positively with productivity 
performance, while higher market concentration works out negatively.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 starts a brief review of the scarce literature on the 
productivity determinants in services. In section 3 we present the two testable empirical models: a global 
stochastic frontier model with deterministic features, and a non-parametric data-envelopment model that 
allows more flexibility in the analysis of scale effects. Section 4 describes our data strategy; together with 
some descriptive statistics. Section 5 presents the results of the econometric tests, and section 6 summarises 
the main findings regarding the structural productivity determinants and some possible implications for 
economic policy. 
2.  Competitive selection in business services: literature review
The literature offers a number of candidate explanations for stagnating productivity growth in the business 
services industry. The 'usual suspects' are a lack of competition, weak entry-exit selection, and regulatory 
barriers. Bartelsman et al. (2000) further mention the role of scale efficiency, management and ownership, 
the quality of the workforce and technology as possible explanations for productivity patterns in industries. 
Grönroos et al. (2004) and Viitamo (2007) somewhat speculatively argue that business services productivity 
is badly measured, because customer participation in the service production process of the services is 
underrated. It is not evident how workforce and management quality, or measurement error could explain 
differences between services sectors and between countries (EU-USA). In this review we focus on three 
groups of explanatory factors: (a) scale inefficiency; (b) market structure and dynamic entry-exit selection; 
and (c) regulatory barriers.
2.1  Scale inefficiency
Returns to scale, or scale elasticity, can be considered as a measurement of the increase in output relative to 
a proportional increase in all inputs. Scale effects are evaluated as marginal changes at a point in the output-
input space. In case of constant returns to scale the output increases with the same amount as the increase in 
inputs. If scale effects, however, exist, an output increase (y) is a function of the change in inputs (x) and 
the already achieved level of inputs (x). Hence, the cost function of firms is sub-additive in case of scale 
economies: it costs less (more) to produce the various output elements together than to produce them 
separately (Frisch 1965). Within one industry, scale economies may differ between groups of firms 
depending on the technology that they (can) apply. Variable or ‘local’ scale economies exist when the range 
of relevant technologies differs between size classes. It means that the output elasticity of at least one input 
is positive over some range of input size, while being negative over another range of input size. 
The market structure for a services sector may be such that efficient production and distribution 
requires some minimum-efficient scale. Operating below this threshold either makes average costs too high 
given market prices, or otherwise the delivered service is too inefficient for being acceptable to clients. 
Scale diseconomies then have a negative effect on the productivity. Compared to manufacturing, scale 
economies in services are much less investigated, partly related to data availability problems (cf. Triplett et 
al., 2004; Diewert 2005). Static scale effects in network services (transport, banking, payment services, 
retail distribution and telecommunication) are reasonably documented, even though economies of scale and 
economies of network adoption are not always easy to distinguish. Pels et al. (2003), studying scale 
economies in airports, find that the average European airport operates under increasing returns to scale in 
producing passenger movements. Schure et al. (1999) conclude that European banks experience positive 
scale economies up to a balance sheet total of 600 million euros, but that the effects strongly diminish at 
larger size. Nevertheless, they find that the average level of X-inefficiency of European banks exceeded 16 
per cent of costs. Static scale effects have also been documented for telecommunications (Bloch et al. 2001).
Studies on static scale economies in non-network services like business services are scarce. Software 
producing services industry may display considerable economies of scale, because of the relation between 
relatively high sunk development costs and almost zero marginal costs of software multiplication (Shy 
2001). For European business services industry, Kox et al. (2007) find that unexploited scale effects appear 
to be associated with imperfect competition. Silk et al. (2003) examined the scale and scope economies in 
advertising and marketing services; they conclude that scale efficiency gains are large at small size, but 
diminish sharply if firm size increases.
2.2 Market structure and dynamic entry-exit selection. 
In a competitive industry with a homogeneous product there is a direct link between productivity, 
profitability and firm growth. Profits are zero for the average firm that can just recover its marginal costs 
from the market price. In such an industry, firms cannot survive and grow when their productivity is 
substantially less than the average for their industry. The persistence of inefficiencies in a dynamic 
perspective would be difficult to understand in an industry with a homogeneous product. Unexploited scale 
advantages could exist only temporarily, because competition would force inefficient firms out of business. 
Due to replicator dynamics, firms with sub-average productivity would experience ever-decreasing market 
shares until their size drops below the minimum-efficient size threshold and they exit business (Cantner 
2007). Several authors found empirical evidence for dynamic productivity-related selection effects (Foster et 
al. 1998; Brown et al. 2006). Jovanovic (1982) developed a framework of 'noisy selection' in which firms 
have different initial efficiency endowments, and their survival depends on market conditions. Efficient 
firms grow and survive, while inefficient firms decline and fail. Also Olley et al. (1996) deal with 
endogenous exit behaviour and input choice decisions of firms. The implication of entry-exit selection is 
that firms with a productivity disadvantage compared to the industry’s productivity frontier will not be 
represented in the long-term ‘steady-state’ firm distribution (De Wit 2005). Due to the selection effect, large 
and older firms tend to have a higher productivity than newcomers. 
The situation changes once we consider services produced under monopolistic competition where 
product and market differentiation prevail. Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) modelled such a market form where all 
firms have a fixed set-up cost and constant marginal costs. If each firm can offer its service variety in its 
own market niche, the firms will not outcompete each other. If the consumers have a sufficient taste for 
variety, not all scale effects will be fully exhausted in this Dixit-Stiglitz world. The sole remaining 
disciplinary market force is the actual or potential entry of new competitors whose product variety competes 
for the same consumer budget. Given sufficient entry, the market share of each service variety will be 
spread so thinly that the most inefficient producers can no longer recover their marginal cost and drop out. If 
free entry in a monopolistic services market is restricted, relatively inefficient producers may survive in the 
market. Both in static and dynamic terms, this lowers productivity performance. 
Finally, competition intensity and productivity selection may also be hampered through market 
power of incumbents and a lack of foreign competition. The lack of incentives or competitive pressures may 
lead monopolistic firms to neglect minimizing unit costs of production, i.e., to tolerate "X-inefficiency" 
(Caves et al. 1975). A lack of international openness of services markets prevents the exposure of inefficient 
firms to the productive and innovative foreign challengers. In that respect, the integration of European 
markets for services still has a long way to go (Copenhagen Economics 2005; Kox et al. 2004, 2006). The 
business services branches IT consultancy, equipment renting and personnel recruitment are the most 
exposed to foreign competition, while the most sheltered branches are accountancy and tax consultancy 
(CSES 2001). 
If firms over time persistently underperform in productivity in European business services, this 
either indicates that imperfect competition prevails, or that the industry has not yet arrived in a steady-state. 
Maybe Vernon's concept of industry life cycles deserves another look, as some branches of the business 
services industry only came into existence over the last 15 years. Vernon (1966) notes that early in the 
industry life cycle it is normal that markets, products and production methods display great diversity, and 
that producers and consumers are not (yet) geared towards price competition or cost efficiency.
2.3 Regulatory barriers and productivity performance. 
Reviewing recent theoretical literature on the relationship between entry, exit and productivity, Kocsis et al. 
(2009) conclude that actual or potential entry does encourage at least some of the incumbents to become 
more efficient. Entry is driven by market opportunities arising either exogenously from GDP growth or as a 
result of the entrant’s own efforts like e.g. innovation activities. Market-entry barriers may however 
discourage or even deter entry. Lowering the size of regulatory entry barriers can thus indirectly stimulate 
higher productivity, because it strengthens competition and/or innovation.
Service markets have a long history of regulation, caused by market failures like externalities and 
information asymmetry that may play a role in the production, distribution and consumption of services. 
Because the production and consumption of the service products often cannot be separated in place and 
time, services products are difficult to standardise, so that the quality of the services product is a priori 
uncertain for the consumer. The buyer of complex professional and medical services is often confronted 
with a structural information asymmetry. The latter forms a basic motivation for much of the regulations in 
professional and business services.
Product market regulation in professional business services may create obstacles to new firm 
entry in the market and it can have a decelerating effect on the process of market share reallocation from 
less efficient to more efficient firms (Nicoletti et al. 2003; Djankov 2002). The impact of regulation can be
such that it introduces fixed entry costs for new firms and thus effectively protects incumbent firms. 
Especially knowledge-intensive services are subject to several types of national regulatory measures 
(Copenhagen Economics 2005; Kox et al. 2006; Paterson et al. 2003).
Regulatory burdens that do not discriminate between firm size often result in a disproportionately 
large compliance costs impact for small and medium-sized firms, hindering their post-entry growth 
(Paterson et al. 2003; Baker et al. 2008). Bartelsman et al. (2000) note that while entry and exit rates are 
fairly similar across industrial countries, post-entry performance differs noticeably between Europe and the 
United States. Post-entry growth in the EU is on average much slower in the EU and regulatory differences 
might partly explain this difference. Klapper et al. (2006) show that European countries with more costly 
entry regulations experience a slower growth of firms numbers in industries with high entry than the US. 
Costly regulations hamper the creation of new firms, force new entrants to be larger and cause incumbent 
firms in otherwise high-entry industries to grow more slowly. Baker et al. (2008) conclude that the impact 
of stringent regulations regarding the types of activities that services providers are allowed to offer are 
reflected in the levels of concentration and consolidation observed in national markets. They find that in 
security services and temporary employment services, countries with high levels of national regulation are 
characterised by much higher degrees of market concentration. By contrast, stringent national regulations on 
who can perform technical consulting services in some EU member states appear to have the opposite effect, 
by creating an entry barrier to these national markets for international competitors and restraining the 
development of larger companies. Olley et al. (1996) estimate firm’s exit and investment behaviour in the 
telecommunications equipment industry during stages of deregulation in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s and 
find that the deregulation waves went along with considerable intra-industry resource reallocation. The 
breakdown of entry barriers apparently altered choices of producers and potential producers regarding their 
input choices, innovative activity, and production volumes. Eventually this results in higher productivity 
growth through a reallocation of market shares, shift in vertical production chains, and an enlarged field of 
competitors.
Not only product-market regulation, but also regulatory measures for employment with regard to 
labour turnover and employment may affect the resource allocation and productivity performance of firms. 
Gust et al. (2002) develop a model with vintage capital and labour to evaluate the effect of more stringent 
labour market regulations on a firm’s decision to adopt new technologies. They analyse that a tax on firing 
workers delays the adoption of information technology (IT) when technological change is skill-biased and 
when firms can only upgrade the quality of their workforce through labour turnover. If IT technology 
adoption is delayed, this lowers productivity. Their empirical results are largely consistent with their model. 
Finally, several authors show that stringent regulation in services may have knock-on effects in 
the rest of the economy. Rajan et al. (1998) found that better efficiency in financial services reduces the 
costs of external finance to firms. Barone et al. (2008) have established that a similar mechanism operates in 
the professional services industry and this affects the use of such services by manufacturing industry. In 
countries with lower service regulation they find faster growth in value added, productivity, and exports by 
downstream service-intensive industries. While they focus on the effects of anti-competitive service 
regulation, their estimates appear robust for considering alternative forms of regulation such as product and 
labour market regulation. 
Summarising, the literature review mentions three structural factors that may hamper productivity 
performance of a services: scale ineffciencies, market dynamics and regulatory factors. All three elements 
will be taken into account in the model that we will be testing.
3.  Empirical strategy
We identify a productivity frontier in EU business services, distinguishing between sub-sectors, countries
and size classes. We use two empirical models: a global stochastic frontier model (GSF) with deterministic 
features, and a non-parametric data-envelopment model (DEA). The parametric and non-parametric model 
have different strengths and weaknesses, hence we will show the results of both approaches. Once having 
identified the productivity frontier we test whether the incidence of sub-frontier productivities by size class 
is explained by X-inefficiencies. Next, we investigate the impact of market and regulatory characteristics 
on the pattern of scale inefficiencies.
We apply the GSF model to analyse scale economies and efficiency frontiers (e.g. Khumbakar et 
al. 1991). The GSF model is built around a translog production function that enables us to identify 
nonlinearities in the response of output to the scale of some inputs. The model identifies a parametric 
productivity frontier that is fixed by the estimated technology parameters of the translog production 
function in combination with the minimal quantities of each input. The GSF model simultaneously 
identifies the productivity frontier and explains X-inefficiency in terms of market and regulatory variables. 
	The GSF model assumes that frontier productivity may differ between size, country and sector. 
However, the technology parameters of the frontier model are identical for all observations. This method 
would be inappropriate if the production elasticities are not constant across sub-sectors or the entire size 
range, e.g. in case of technological or organisational discontinuities across the size range. To deal with this 
possibility we apply a robustness analysis with a model that uses inefficiencies derived from Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA). The DEA-model allows more flexibility by dropping the homogeneity 
assumption underlying the parametrically defined frontier allowing a deeper look into the nature of the 
scale effects.
3.1 GSF model. 
The availability of panel data enables us to apply the global stochastic frontier model of Battese and Coelli 
(1995) based on a technical production function of the translog type. The translog specification allows for 
inputs to have an effect on output that can vary with the output level. It explicitly checks for local scale 
effects by adding quadratic terms and interaction terms for the inputs. 
The starting point is a value-added production function, because this does not need restrictive 
separability assumptions on the underlying technology (Diewert 2005; Schreyer 2001). The Battese-Coelli 
model imposes that the error term of the translog model consists of deterministic X-inefficiencies , and a 
white-noise component µ. A second equation explains the X-inefficiencies () from a vector of exogenous 
variables. After rewriting the translog product function to get labour productivity as the dependent variable, 
the two-equation GSF model reads: 
2 2
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In (1) Y is value added, K denotes physical capital inputs, and L represents labour inputs. The parameters 1
and 2 reflect the linear effects of more inputs on value added. The parameters 11 and 22 represent the non-
linear input effects. The ‘cross’ parameter 12 picks up local interactions between capital and labour; it 
becomes significant if the output elasticity of a particular input depends on the level of the other input 
(input complementarity). Vector B in the first equation collects a set of dummy variables to control for 
unobservable frontier productivity differences between sub-sectors, countries, size classes and time. 
Furthermore, subscript t refers to time and subscript i denotes a panel indicator that refers to a particular 
combination of country, sub-sector and size class. Equation (2) reflects that mean X-inefficiencies () are 
determined by the exogenous variables collected in Z and that deviations from these means are random 
('white noise'), represented by . Z may include variables linked market structure and regulatory 

environment, as will be specified later on. The random variable  is defined by the truncation of the normal 
distribution with zero mean and variance 2τσ , such that itγ ′− Z is the point of truncation.2 Hence, 
it itθ γ ′≥ − Z .
The GSF panel data method of Battese and Coelli (1995) boils down to parametrising the 
deviations from frontier productivity by using equation (2) and by estimating the two equations 
simultaneously with a Maximum Likelihood method. Our application of the Battese-Coelli model assumes 
the following: 
• A homogeneous technology holds for all countries, sub-sectors, size classes and years, so that 
technology parameters are equal for all firms.
• Frontier productivity can differ by firm size, country, sub-sector and year (identified by the dummies 
collected in B in equation (1)).
• Firms can under-perform compared to the frontier and this under-performance depends in a 
deterministic way on the variables collected in the Z vector.
• Size-related X-inefficiencies are estimated after controlling for exogenous market structure variables 
and regulation variables.
3.2 DEA model. 
A parametric model like the GSF model may cope with the stochastic nature of the relation between output 
and inputs. In the absence of knowledge of the underlying production process, the translog technology as 
assumed in the GSF model may be a good first representation. The GSF model imposes the assumptions 
that all size classes can apply the same technology and that scale effects occur over the entire scale range. 
Although flexible, the GSF model imposes a restrictive functional form and it needs specific assumptions 
concerning the distribution of efficiencies. Moreover, our GSF estimates may suffer from endogeneity or 
simultaneity biases when a correlation exists between the inputs and the disturbance term of the production 
function. Zellner et al. (1966) pointed out that capital and labour inputs are not correlated with the 
disturbance term of the production function if we are willing to assume that the underlying full model takes 
‘expected’ and stochastic output and ‘expected’ and stochastic profit maximization as the starting point.3
The fitted GSF technology is an “average” or sample-wide estimate, which may not represent scale 
behaviour at lower levels. The GSF model is adequate to detect sample-wide scale effects under the 
assumption that firms in all scale classes apply the same technology. This is a good approximation if we do 
have insufficient knowledge about the firm’s production process. GSF thus yields an “average” sample-
wide result. The GSF model is less appropriate when we expect that technology may differ across firm size. 
2 These assumptions are consistent with itθ being a non-negative truncation of the ),( 2τσγ′ itZN distribution which is 
assumed not be correlated with the idiosyncratic disturbance itµ of equation (1).3 Annex 1 demonstrates that this type of endogeneity is probably of limited relevance in the present study.

The translog estimates may suggest the presence of constant returns to scale (CRS), whereas we have in 
reality variable returns to scale (VRS). Even if the CRS assumption is not rejected for the entire sample by 
the translog estimates, still many firms could operate on a sub-optimal scale. Moreover, a firm that is 
operating on the technological frontier may not be as productive as the frontier firms in other size classes if 
scale efficiencies differ locally by size class. Because of these issues we apply the Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) as a robustness check and as an alternative for investigating the interaction between scale 
effects and market structure. The DEA method does not impose an a priori structure on productivity 
relations of interest, whereas in the GSF model the efficiency estimates are directly related to the model 
parameters (assumed to be unbiased). 
The DEA method proceeds by applying linear programming to construct a non-parametric piece-wise 
surface over the observed data for each meaningful grouping of firms (e.g. Coelli et al. 2005). This gives a 
technological frontier that represents the ‘best-practice’ technology. From this we subsequently derive a set 
of X-efficiency measures and a direct measure of scale efficiency by size class. This approach circumvents 
the technological homogeneity assumption of the parametric GSF approach. It also avoids the potential 
simultaneity biases related to the estimated parameters for the translog model.
3.3 Implementation of DEA and calculation of scale inefficiency
A few choices have to be made for implementing DEA. We assume that firms have a better control over 
their inputs than over their output, and hence we follow the input orientation. DEA with input orientation 
looks at the potential cost reductions that can be achieved given a certain level of output. A second ‘fine 
tuning’ is that we allow both for a variable-returns-to-scale (VRTS) technology and a constant-returns-to-
scale (CRTS) technology. 
We construct for every business services branch (j) and each year (t) a ‘model free’ global 
efficiency frontier by pooling data of all size classes and countries in our sample. This allows us to 
calculate an X-efficiency indicator, based on the distance to the global industry-specific frontier for each 
combination i of country and size class.4 Using H as symbol for (average) productivity the VRTS X-
efficiency indicator reads:
,
; 0 1 ( )ijtVRTS VRTSijt ijtfrontier VRTS
jt
H
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H
 	
≡ < ≤
 

  
      (3)    
4 Throughout this paper we uniformly use a positive efficiency measure (X-efficiency and scale efficiency) rather than 
the corresponding negative expression (X-inefficiency, scale inefficiency). Since all our efficiency measures are scaled 
continuously in the {0, 1} dimension, the corresponding inefficiency measures are simply derived as complements (1 
minus the efficiency level).

DEA also allows calculating straightforwardly a direct measure for scale efficiency. This is done by 
recalculating the size-specific distances to the industry-specific frontiers under the hypothetical assumption 
that firms operate at an optimal scale under an industry-specific CRTS technology. This yields the 
counterfactual benchmark for scale efficiency. If a particular size class is the optimal scale the X-efficiency 
indicator for that size class is identical for the CRTS and the VRTS assumptions. However, if firms size is 
larger or smaller than the optimal scale, X-efficiencies will be smaller (closer to 0) for VRTS than for 
CRTS. Using the CRTS efficiency as benchmark the SCE scale-efficiency indicator is thus derived as:
,
,
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Summarising, for each grouping of the data we get three efficiency measures: (a) two X-efficiency 
indicators (XEVRTS, XECRTS) that depict the distance to the industry frontier (across size classes and 
countries), and (b) a scale-efficiency indicator that measures per industry the distance of a particular size 
class to the most efficient size class (across countries). All three efficiency indicators are strictly positive 
and run from zero (lowest) to 1 (frontier). 
Finally, we test whether the X-efficiency scores ,VRTS CRTSijt ijtXE XE  and scale efficiency scores 
SCEijt can be explained with the help of a panel-data Tobit regression model using as independent variables 
size class, market characteristics and national regulatory conditions. The structure of the Tobit model for 
the logarithm of ijtSCE is:
ln( )ijt ijt ijt ijtSCE δ λ υ′ ′= + +X Z (5)
with X representing a vector of dummy variables for industries and size classes and Z collecting the same 
market-structure and regulation variables as used in the GSF model. The structure of the Tobit models for 
the two X-efficiency measures is similar. Based on the literature, we expect a negative impact of regulation 
intensity on both X-efficiency and on scale efficiency, whereas variables that depict an increase in 
competition and entry-exit selection are expected to have a positive impact.
4.  Data and descriptive statistics
4.1 Introduction
Testing structural productivity determinants (market structure, regulation and scale economies) in the 
dynamic setting of competitive selection requires firm-level panel data. We need enough inter-country 
variation to test for the role of regulatory characteristics and we need sufficient data for the smallest firm-
size classes to investigate the role of scale economies. The last condition turned out to be a problem. 
Though nowadays commercial databases are available with data on business services firms in many 

countries, the representation of small firms in these data sets can at best be called poor. Such data are still 
only available on a national basis from local statistical authorities, often under strict confidentiality 
conditions. 
We solve the limited data availability by using Eurostat’s NewCronos firm demography database. 
The available data on business services are sourced from national statistical offices, and cover many EU 
countries and the period 1995-2005. Each data cell provides information about a country x industry x size 
class combination: the number of firms, total sales, total value added, number of employed persons, and 
total fixed capital, approximated with depreciation. With these data we construct a representative firm or 
decision-making unit (DMU) for every combination of country x industry x size class. Recent empirical 
insights on the structure of firm size distributions suggest that the firm-size distribution across and within 
size classes is similar (Axtell 2001). From this we infer that the use of constructed representative firms per 
data cell still allows marginal analysis as is necessary for the study of scale economies. Annex I addresses 
this issue in more detail. 
The construction of the data base requires a few further decisions, because the national statistical 
offices until recently used to deliver statistical data on business services industry with different degrees of 
sector and firm-size detail. To allow full comparison across European countries we homogenise 
classifications at the lowest common denominator, thus sacrificing some available sub-sector and size-class 
detail and data years in the data from some countries.5 Homogenisation across countries yields a fully 
comparable set of data on business services industry in 13 EU countries, for eight sub-sectors and five size 
classes for the period 2000-2005. 
4.2 Variables
This subsection discusses the sources and the definition of our dependent variable and the explanatory 
variables respectively that we use for estimating the GSF model and DEA model.
As the central productivity measure and dependent variable for this study we use labour 
productivity, defined as value added per employed full-time person. The data would have allowed using
total factor productivity (TFP) instead, but we have deliberately chosen not to use this measure. TFP is a 
non-explained residual from growth accounting, and as such a "measure of our ignorance" as Abramovitz 
already remarked in 1956. For TFP to be a correct measure of multi-factor productivity, a number of crucial 
conditions have to be met. One of such conditions is that factor input markets and output markets have 
perfect competition, so that production factors are rewarded according to their marginal product and output 
prices are equal to marginal costs. Since these market conditions are precisely what we intend to investigate 
in business services, the use of TFP as productivity measure has to be ruled out.
5 The firm size classification is derived from the number of employed persons per firm, including employer. We use 
one employed person per firm as the cut-off point, although some countries offer data for the size class with less than 
one full-time employed person.
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Regarding production technology, we use depreciation as proxy for fixed-capital inputs and for 
the number of employed persons as proxy for labour input. Both variables come from Eurostat’s 
NewCronos firm demography database.
In order to characterise market structure, a combination is used of three indicators: average 
market size per firm,  the Hirschmann-Herfindahl index (HHI) for concentration of market shares, and the 
average entry-exit rate per market. The average market size per firm is an indicator for competition 
intensity. It is calculated as the reciproque of the number of firms per data cell (country  industry  firm-
size class), normalised for country size (country’s total number of firms in a particular industry). 
Normalisation is applied to prevent that this variable picks up the effect of country size. The average entry-
exit rate per market is an indicator for the intensity of competitive selection. It is calculated as the annual 
firm births minus annual firm death as a percentage of the number of active incumbent firms by country, 
industry and size class. Data for these indicators are derived from the Eurostat SBS panel and the Eurostat 
data on business demography. 
Finally, the national regulatory environment of business services firms is depicted by a 
combination of four indicators, all derived from the World Bank's Cost of Doing Business database. The 
World Bank data capture both the relative strictness of the regulations themselves as well as the efficiency 
of the national regulatory apparatus that implements the data.6 The four indicators are: (a) an overall index
based on 28 sub-indices for policy-caused business costs; (b) an exit-costs indicator for the regulation-
caused costs of closing a business; (c) an indicator for the costs of setting up a registering a new firm; and 
(d) an indicator for the degree of inflexibility in employment contracts, representing national differences in 
costs for labour reallocation, hiring and firing. For each of these for indicators it holds that a higher score 
represents more regulation-caused costs for firms.
4.3 Descriptive statistics
Figure 1 shows that the size-class dimension of the data set contains variation. The two top curves in the 
graph depict the average labour productivity per size class in EU business services for the years 2000 and 
2005. The curvature suggests that the labour productivity is highest in the size class with 50-249 employed 
persons. The difference between both curves suggests that average productivity has fallen between 2000 
and 2005. The bottom curve in Figure 1 gives the first difference of average productivity by size class, 
suggesting that average productivity has diminished the least in the size class with 10-19 employed persons. 
The graph only gives a first description, without correction for fixed-capital intensity or for composition 
differences (industry, country) in the averages for both years. 
6
 This database shows national differences in policy-related costs of doing business by quantifying per country how 
identical, well-defined business plans would be handled by national regulatory systems in terms of costs, time 
efficiency and red tape (cf. Djankov et al. 2008). For a full description of the case studies see www.doingbusiness.org. 
While the Costs of Doing Business database only provides national rankings, we have use the database to derive 
more precise indicators for a number of sub-aggregates of business costs. The calculation method of the indices is 
documented in the Annex of Nordås et al. (2009). 

Figure 1       Average labour productivity by size class in total EU business services, 
average for 13 EU countries, 2000 and 2005
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Table 1 Selected country characteristics of the dataset, all industries, 2000-2005
2000 -2005 average share 
(%) of small firmsb) in: 
Country No. of  
data 
points  
No. of 
firms 
covered
(x1000)
Employ-
ment 
covered 
(x1000)
Product-
ivity
level a) 
(x1000 
euro)
total no. of 
firms
total 
employ-
ment 
Overall cost 
of doing 
business d)
2005
Cost of
starting up a 
new firm e)
2005 
Flexibility in 
employment 
contracts 
index f)
2005
Austria 196 42 243 28.4 91.3 35.6 0.76 0.61 0.69
Belgium 184 76 386 33.8 95.7 28.5 0.69 0.61 0.62
Denmark 96 16 108 37.6 91.4 24.6 0.55 0.19 0.20
Finland 98 16 81 33.2 94.1 33.6 0.67 0.25 1.09
France 240 399 2684 29.7 93.5 24.2 0.79 0.26 1.40
Germany 240 344 3242 28.6 87.0 23.0 0.84 0.60 1.34
Ireland 103 11 70 34.4 91.5 36.4 0.65 0.38 0.50
Italy 240 739 2059 28.0 97.5 53.0 1.08 0.66 0.83
Netherlands 230 104 677 42.1 91.7 24.8 0.80 0.53 1.02
Portugal 193 60 281 12.6 96.2 37.0 1.12 1.06 1.56
Spain 160 378 1918 18.9 95.2 34.7 1.12 1.01 1.54
Sweden 207 141 453 30.4 96.7 43.2 0.80 0.25 0.96
Un.Kingdom 175 426 3234 44.0 91.2 26.8 0.44 0.34 0.29
Total 2362 2751 15436
Average 182 212 1187 30.9 93.3 30.9 0.79 0.52 0.93
a) Productivity level as value added per employed person (in 1000 Euros, constant prices), average for all business services branches, 2000-2005.  
b) Share of firms with less than 10 employed persons.  c) Composite indicator of regulation-caused cost of doing business (0 is lowest level), 
relative to a 60-country sample, based on 28 subindicators in Cost of Doing Business database (cf. Nordås et al. 2009).  d) Relative regulation-
related costs of starting up a new firm (0 is lowest level), relative to a 60-country sample, based on 3 subindicators in Cost of Doing Business 
database (cf. Djankov et al. 2002; OECD 2009). e) Composite indicator for regulation-related flexibility in hiring and firing workers (0 is lowest 
level), relative to a 60-country sample, based on 4 subindicators in Cost of Doing Business database (cf. Nordås et al. 2009).
Data sources:  Eurostat New Cronos, Firm demography, business services by size class. Data for the Netherlands compiled from the production 
census data of  Statistics Netherlands, using the New Cronos classification of size classes.  Regulation indicators derived from World Bank Cost of 
Doing Business database (for calculation method, see: OECD 2009).
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Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on the country variation in the data set. With on average 182 data 
cells per country we have 2,362 observations, covering 2.8 million EU business services firms with 15.4 
million employed persons. The latter numbers show that business services typically forms a small-scale 
industry. The overwhelming share of firms has less than ten employed persons. Italy, Portugal and Sweden 
have the largest share of firms with less than ten employed persons. In terms of their share in total 
employment, the smallest size class accounts inmost countries for 25-33% with again Italy and Sweden 
being the exceptions. The average productivity differs considerably between countries, though industry 
composition effects and country differences in average income also play a role here. Average productivity 
is highest in Netherlands and the UK, and lowest in Italy and Portugal.
Table 1 also displays country differences with respect to three regulatory variables that we will 
use as explanatory variables. The three regulation indicators show considerable variation between 
countries.
The average productivity level in many branches of business services is quite high compared to 
manufacturing. Knowledge-intensive services firms have a higher value added per worker because they 
employ highly qualified workers with relatively high wage rates. Productivity levels are much lower in 
business services sectors that produce standardised services like industrial cleaning, security, packaging, 
bookkeeping and administrative tasks. In Table 2 we document the variation in our dataset by the industry 
dimension, showing that substantial differences exist between the 3-digit sub-sectors. Productivity levels 
Table 2 Selected industry characteristics of the dataset, average for 13 EU countries, 2000-2005
Industry 
branch by 
NACE 
code a)
No. of  
data 
points,
annually  
No. of 
firms 
covered 
annually
(x1000)
Employ-
ment 
covered 
annually 
(x1000)
Produc-
tivity 
level
(x1000 
euro) b)
Average 
firm size 
(in empl. 
persons)
Average 
fixed 
capital per 
employed 
person c)
Average 
entry-exit 
rate d)
Average 
market share 
concentra-
tion (HHI-
index) e)
Average 
market size 
per firm f)
K720 245 335 1952 49.3 5.8 35.5 4.7% 0.114 0.02%
K741 309 937 3363 38.9 3.6 32.3 4.2% 0.137 0.02%
K742_3 365 591 1975 35.8 3.3 29.0 2.5% 0.132 0.04%
K744 270 123 610 34.2 5.0 26.6 2.3% 0.128 0.07%
K745 293 30 2014 25.5 66.2 5.7 7.8% 0.129 0.06%
K746 278 21 594 19.0 28.2 11.1 5.1% 0.130 0.13%
K747 305 101 2183 14.6 21.6 7.6 3.0% 0.129 0.04%
K748 297 403 1504 29.6 3.7 34.8 4.7% 0.130 0.04%
Total 2362 2542 14194
Average 30.9 17.2 22.820 4.3% 0.129 0.05%
a) Codes: K720 = computer-related services; K741= Legal, accounting, and auditing activities; tax consultancy; market and public 
opinion research ; business and management consultancy; K742_3 = Engineering, technical testing, architects; K744 = 
Advertising; K745 = Labour recruitment and (temporary) provision of personnel; K746 = Security services and investigations; 
K747 = Industrial cleaning; K748 = Miscellaneous business activities not elsewhere classified.  b) Productivity level as value 
added per employed person (in 1000 Euros, constant prices), average for all sample countries, 2000-2005.  c) Firm average for 
fixed capital per employed worker (in 1000 Euros, constant prices), average for all sample countries, 2000-2005.   d) Average 
entry-exit rate: annual firm births minus annual firm death as a percentage of the number of active incumbent firms.  e) 
Hirschmann-Herfindahl market concentration index.   f) Industry average for market share per firm (normalised by total number of 
firms per country), average for all sample countries, 2000-2005. Data sources: own calculations based on Eurostat NewCronos 
data, SBS and EUKLEMS data.
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are highest in K720 (computer services) and K741 (legal, accounting, and consultancy services). The sub-
sectors K745 (temporary labour intermediation), K746 (industrial cleaning) and K747 (security services) 
display a distinctly larger average firm size than the rest of the sub-sectors. This difference in apparent 
scale economies is mirrored in a significantly lower amount of fixed capital per worker between these three 
sub-sectors and the rest of them. 
Table 2 also shows average differences with regard to three indicators for market structure. Sub-
sectors K745 and K746 have above average entry-exit rates (relatively strong dynamic selection), while 
K742/3 (engineering and architectural services) and K744 (marketing services) have low entry-exit rates 
(i.e. sluggish selection dynamics).
Figure 2 plots fixed-capital intensity per worker for the five different size classes. This confirms 
the indications from Table 2 about the differences in apparent scale economies between sub-sectors. The 
fixed-capital economies are about exhausted at a scale of 50 employed persons in temporary labour, 
cleaning and security services, whereas the picture in other branches is much more differentiated. The 
computer services industry displays an U-shaped capital intensity, which is markedly different from all 
other industries where the largest size class has the lowest capital intensity. A possible explanation for the 
pattern in computer services is that the largest size classes invest more in basic research and mainframe
systems per employee.
Figure 2     Capital intensity per employed worker, 2000-2005 average by industry
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Note: industry codes are: K72 = computer-related services; K741= Legal, accounting, and auditing activities; tax consultancy; market 
and public opinion research ; business and management consultancy; K742_43 = Engineering, technical testing, architects; K744 = 
Advertising; K745 = Labour recruitment and (temporary) provision of personnel; K746 = Security services and investigations; K747 = 
Industrial cleaning; K748 = Miscellaneous business activities not elsewhere classified.  
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5. Estimation results
5.1 Results GSF-model  
Table 3 presents the estimates of the GSF model. Panel A shows the results of equation (1). Business 
services firms are – on average – characterized by increasing returns to scale, because the sum of the 
estimated technology parameters is slightly above one. The parameters for the non-linear input effects of 
the technology variables are significantly different from zero, indicating that scale effects are local and 
depend on input size. Note that the results are obtained after controlling for frontier differences through 
dummies for countries, sub-sectors and size classes.
Table 3     Estimates General Stochastic Frontier (GSF) model, panel data 2000-2005
Dependent variable: log(labour productivity)
Estimate a) t-value
A) Translog-derived production function
Technology variables:
* Fixed capital 0.23*** 11.3
* Labour inputs 0.92*** 18.5
* Capital based local scale effects  0.05***  5.1
* Labour based local scale effects  0.12***  11.7
* Capital-labour interaction 0.05*** 6.8
Industry dummy included                 yes
Country dummy included               yes
Size dummy included               yes
Year dummy included               yes
Constant 3.18*** 56.8
B) X-inefficiency equation
Market structure variables:
* Average market share per data cell   0.04***  4.0
* HHI, Herfindahl index, micro-based  0.23  0.5
Regulatory environment:
* Overall Cost of Doing Business indicator  1.41*** 6.6
Size dummies included            yes
No. of observations       2362
Log Likelihood         366.6
a) Codes: * significant at 10% confidence level, ** significant 5% level, *** significant at 1% level.
Panel B of Table 3 presents the simultaneous estimates for equation (2) of the GSF model. For the 
interpretation of these results it is important to realise that panel B gives the results for equation (2) in 
which  is an X-inefficiency measure. So a positive parameter sign means that the variable contributes 
	
positively to the degree of inefficiency, and hence lowers efficiency. The estimates suggest that a larger 
average market share (i.e., less firms per data cell) increases X-efficiency. This effect is counter-intuitive. A 
possible explanation is that this result picks up a positive correlation between average market share and 
scale efficiency. Arguably, in order to be able to capture scale economies firms have to grow, and gaining 
market share is a way to achieve this. This result may therefore point to the endogeneity of market shares.7
Fiercer competition may force inefficient firms to leave the market. This increases the market share of 
efficient firms, and positively correlates with X-efficiency. Next, market concentration as measured by the 
HHI appears not to have a significant impact on X-efficiency. Finally, higher regulation intensity according 
to ‘Cost of Doing Business’ indicator has a significant negative effect on X-efficiency. This indicator is
lagged one year which we assume to be a reasonable reaction time for firms. An explanation for this is that 
incumbent firms become less efficient as the threat of entry is lower due to more regulation related with 
sunk costs. This is in line with the predictions from the literature (cf. section 2). 
5.2  Comparison with DEA  
We apply DEA both as a robustness check on the GSF results and as a method that allows to look deeper 
into the issue of scale efficiency. As can be seen in equation (4) the scale-efficiency indicator depends on 
both X-efficiency indicators (XEVRTS, XECRTS). Inaccuracy would occur when measurement error hinders the 
correct identification of the VRTS and CRTS reference points for a particular data cell or decision-making 
unit. Annex I explains why this type of bias will be limited given the type of data that we use.
Table 4 compares the X-efficiency predictions of the GSF method with the X-efficiency 
measures derived from DEA (XEVRTS, XECRTS). We recall that the DEA measures are calculated for every 
services sub-sector and year. The size of the XEVRTS results is similar to the GSF-predictions for the smallest 
Table 4     Comparison of GSF and DEA X-efficiencies, averages per size class, 2000-2005
Calculated X-efficiencies on basis of DEA-model b)Predicted efficiency 
GSF-model a)
 (median for size 
class)                          
 XEVRTS
(median for size 
class)
  XECRTS
(median for size class)
Size classes:
 * 1–9  employed persons 0.857 0.924 0.417
 * 10–19 employed persons 0.870 0.605 0.566
 * 20–49 employed persons 0.907 0.620 0.599
 * 50–249 employed persons 0.883 0.668 0.653
 * 250 employed persons 0.819 0.808 0.701
All size classes 0.875 0.722 0.594
a)
 X-inefficiency predictions on the basis of Battese-Coelli method calculated as e τ− in order to be comparable with 
the DEA indicators. 
b)
  X-inefficiency indicator DEA allowing variable returns to scale (cf. equation 3).  
7 The method of Battese and Coelli (1993) does not allow to take endogeneity of regressors into account.


and the largest size classes. However, for the other size classes we find different estimates. This is not 
surprising, because a non-parametric variable-returns-to-scale frontier always envelops the data more 
tightly than the returns-to-scale technology embodied in the GSF model. Averaged over all observations, 
the GSF model overestimates the X-efficiency in comparison to the preferred XEVRTS measure, while the 
XECRTS indicator tends to underestimate it. 
The DEA X-efficiency indicators give the distance to an industry-wide frontier averaged across 
all size classes. It is however possible that not all size classes have the same efficiency, some may be 
operating on a sub-optimal scale, not exhausting potential scale gains. This is measured by the SCE scale-
efficiency indicator (equation 5). We have jointly pictured the three most relevant efficiency indicators in
Figure 3. The results are quite spectacular. The smallest size class has the lowest degree of X-inefficiency 
according to XEVRTS (and about the GSF average). It means that within this size class firms apply nearly
Figure 3   Comparison of three efficiency indicators by size class (average all sub-sectors and 
countries, 2000-2005)
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similar technologies. However, the SCE scale-efficiency indicator shows that -from a productivity 
perspective- the technology of the smallest size class is definitely sub-optimal compared to other size 
classes. The scale efficiency is only about half that of the next size class (10-19 employed persons). Beyond 
10-19 workers scale efficiency increases only marginally, reaching a top at 50-249 workers. The average X-
efficiency is however lowest in the size classes with 10-49 workers, suggesting that within these size 
classes there must be the largest dispersion of applied technologies compared to all other size classes. 
Firms operating on a sub-optimal scale may fall within the increasing-returns-to-scale part of the 
production function. We explore this issue by a further analysis of the DEA results. For each data cell we 
calculate whether it is subject to increasing, decreasing or constant returns to scale (RTS). Whether a data 

cell is subject to increasing, decreasing or constant returns to scale is calculated by solving a corresponding 
linear-programming problem for each observation.
Table 5 presents the distribution over size classes of RTS-characteristics and the scale 
inefficiency scores, averaging over all years, countries and sub-sectors. The vast majority of data cells 
appears tot operate in the increasing-returns-to-scale region (IRTS) of the production function. The 
distribution across size classes shows however that also a considerable number of cases operates in the 
decreasing-returns-to-scale region (DRTS). The pattern of DEA-scale efficiencies permits the conclusion 
that many small firms have the potential to increase their productivity by a better use of scale economies. 
Especially the potential scale gains of the smallest firms look quite sizable.
Table 5  DEA scale efficiencies and the nature of marginal returns to scale by 
 size class (average all sub-sectors and countries, 2000-2005)
Nature of marginal returns to scale,
 % of cases per size class
Scale-efficiency  
(SCE), median 
by size class a) increasing 
(IRTS)
decreasing 
(DRTS)
constant 
(CRTS)
Size classes:
 * 1–9  employed persons 0.477 97.0 0.6 2.3
 * 10–19 employed persons 0.932 85.8 10.7 3.5
 * 20–49 employed persons 0.971 80.4 15.0 4.6
 * 50–249 employed persons 0.990 64.8 27.5 7.8
 *  250 employed persons 0.983 26.0 55.0 19.0
All size classes 0.955 72.1 21.7 7.1
a)
  Scale-efficiency indicator as defined in equation 4 (using constant returns to scale as a benchmark).
5.3 Explaining DEA inefficiencies  
In a fully competitive industry with entry-exit selection it would be difficult to understand why scale 
inefficiencies could persist over time. The question is to what extent scale efficiencies in the panel 
dimension can be explained by market-structure and regulation. We analyse this question with a Tobit 
regression model. Because of our data limitations we cannot identify whether individual firms move 
between size classes. We therefore opt for a random-effects panel estimator instead of relying on a model 
with firm-level fixed-effects.8 We compensate for this data restriction by adding control data on  the 
intensity of entry-exit selection per business services industry and per country from another source 
(Eurostat Business Demography data).
Whereas in Table 3 we only used one comprehensive indicator for national regulation 
differences, it is now time to zoom in on the role of specific regulation domains so as to understand which 
	 The data-driven use of 'average' firms per data cell (country  industry  size class) as basic units of analysis limits 
the range of applicable econometric methods. The availability of full micro data would have allowed to control whether 
firm-specific fixed effects (such as management quality) are important for the production and input choices that govern 
productivity outcomes. However, FE testing is out of the question, since we cannot identify which firms are 
represented in each year's data cell 'average'. A firm that in year t is in size class 1 may or may not have been grown 
into size class 2 at year t+x.  

regulation types matter most for productivity and scale economies. Regulation indices for three specific 
policy areas are added: the costs of starting up and registering a new business (entry costs), the costs of 
closing a business (exit costs), and the costs of inflexibility in employment contracts (representing national 
differences in costs for labour reallocation, hiring and firing).
Table 6 provides the marginal effects of a change in the explanatory variables in the conditional 
mean for DEA X-efficiencies and DEA scale efficiencies calculated on the basis of the random-effects 
Tobit models. All continuous variables are expressed in logarithms, so that their estimated parameters can 
be interpreted as elasticities. All market structure and regulation variables in the columns (1) and (2) have a 
negative impact on X-efficiency as we would expect them to have. The impact of average market share per 
firm (within a data cell) does not appear to be statistically significant, however. The regulation-caused entry 
costs, exit costs and employment inflexibility all have a negative impact on X-efficiency, with the largest 
effect coming from exit costs.  
Table 6    Estimates for DEA efficiencies based on Random Effects Tobit model 
Dependent variables
DEA X-efficiencies DEA Scale efficiencies
log(XE VRTS) log(SCE)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimated c) Z Estimated c) Z
Size-class dummies: a)
 *  10 - 19 empl. persons  0.507***  12.5 0.623*** 22.3
 *  20 - 49 empl. persons  0.471***  11.2 0.657*** 22.7
 *  50 - 249 empl. person  0.405***  9.0 0.655*** 21.2
 *   250 empl. persons  0.224***  4.4 0.562*** 16.1
Market structure:
 * Average market share  0.005  0.9 0.019*** 5.1
 * HHI (micro based)  0.023***  3.7  0.014***  4.0
Regulation indices:
 * Starting a business  0.140***  6.8  0.002  0.2
 * Closing a business  0.211***  3.1  0.224***  5.0
 * Employment inflexibility  0.067***  2.7  0.057***  3.6
Industry dummies b) Yes                  Yes
No. of observations 2362 2362
Log Likelihood 808.6 479.6
a) The smallest size class (1-9 employed persons) is taken as a benchmark.  b) The computer services 
industry (K720) is taken as a benchmark.  c) Codes, derived from Z values: ** significant at 5% confidence 
level, *** significant at 1% level.  Source: own calculations.
The columns (3) and (4) of Table 6 give the Tobit random-effect estimates for the model that explains DEA 
scale-efficiencies. Having a higher within-size class market share appears to increase scale efficiency. Like 
in the GSF estimates our hypothesis to explain this effect is that, in order to capture scale economies, firms 
have to gain in market shares. The strong impact of scale diseconomies in the smallest size class (as 

depicted in Figure 3) might be sufficient to explain this effect. This is all the more plausible since the 
significant negative estimate for the HHI means that over the entire range of size classes a higher entry 
costs play no role for the large scale inefficiency of the smallest size class (Figure 3).9 Regulation-related 
exit costs appear to form the main regulatory obstacle for competitive selection and efficiency, followed 
only at distance by the regulation-caused employment inflexibility. These two regulation sub-indicators 
measure different things as appears from the correlation matrix for the applied regulation indicators in 
Annex 2.10
5.4   Adding information on the dynamics of entry and exit  
The regulation variables in Table 6 might pick up the intensity of real entry-exit dynamics while regulation 
itself is not the 'culprit'. As a robustness test we therefore check whether the previous results remain stable 
after including a measure of real entry-exit dynamics. We include this variable in the Tobit models for DEA 
scale efficiencies. The results are presented in Table 7. 
We find a positive parameter for the entry-exit variable; entry-exit intensity apparently captures 
an additional competitive incentive separate from competition between incumbent firms. Higher net entry 
rates increase the incentive to gain in efficiency and this impact on efficiency turns out to be rather 
considerable.
More striking is the result that adding net entry-exit rates does not alter the other estimates very 
much. There is no change in significance of the already included variables. Despite the reduction of the 
sample (from 2362 to 1238), the negative impact of regulation-caused exit costs turns out to be even 
stronger than before, and the same holds for the negative impact of regulation-caused employment 
inflexibility. Apparently, both regulation types really obstruct the process of competitive selection in 
business services, and hence, hinder an improvement of the productivity performance of business services 
in the EU.
5.5 Testing for optimal scale size  
Another feature of our data is that we are able to test for the existence of an optimal scale of operation in 
business services using the size-class dummies. Their estimated parameters can be interpreted as the 
difference in scale efficiencies between size classes, conditional on other determinants of (differences in) 
scale efficiency. The Tobit models of Tables 6 and 7 use a constant term (not reported). Thus the estimates 
for the size dummies in these tables refer to the difference of size related scale efficiencies compared to the 
reference group, i.e. the size class with firms employing less than 10 persons (size class 1).
9 An intuitive interpretation might be that a personal computer and small office are sufficient to startup in many 
branches of the business services.
10
  Annex 2 shows possible multicollinearity between the sub-indicators ‘Starting a Business’ and ‘Employment 
Flexibility’ (pairwise correlation coefficient of 0.59). However, since ‘Starting a business’ is not statistically significant in 
the regressions of Tables 6 and 7 this need not be a problem. The umbrella indicator for Overall Costs of Doing 
Business correlates strongly with two sub-indicators (‘Starting a business’, ‘Employment Flexibility’), but we do not 
apply the umbrella indicator jointly with the sub-indicators. 

Table 7 DEA scale efficiencies estimated by Random Effects Tobit model after including 
net entry-exit rates, 2000-2005
Dependent variables
log(SCE) log(SCE)
panel data panel data
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimated c) Z-value Estimated c) Z-value
Size-class dummies: a)
 *  10 - 19 empl. persons 0.719*** 19.3 0.696*** 18.7
 *  20 - 49 empl. persons 0.755*** 19.5 0.723*** 18.5
 *  50 - 249 empl. person 0.759*** 18.2 0.715*** 16.9
 *   250 empl. persons 0.665*** 13.8 0.599*** 12.0
Market structure:
 * Average market share 0.015*** 2.8 0.025*** 4.4
 * HHI (micro based)  0.013***  2.0  0.013***  2.2
 * Entry-exit (firm demography) 0.326*** 2.3 0.316*** 2.2
Regulation indices:
 * Overall Cost of Doing Business  0.238***  5.5
 * Starting a business 0.01 0.6
 * Closing a business  0.313***  3.0
 * Employment inflexibility  0.144***  5.2
Industry dummies b) Yes Yes
No. of observations 1238 1238
Log Likelihood 808.6 479.6
a) The smallest size class (1-9 employed persons) is taken as a benchmark.  b) The computer services industry
(K720) is taken as a benchmark.  c) Codes, derived from z values: ** significant at 5% confidence level, 
*** significant at 1% level.  Source: own calculations.
We use the estimates of the size class dummies to apply a sequence of Wald tests for testing the 
significance of differences between size class dummy estimates. The main results for the DEA scale 
efficiency models are presented in Table 8. The first entry concerns the estimate for the difference between 
size class 2 (10 – 19 employed persons) and the reference group (firms with less than 10 employed 
persons). In all models, this difference is very sizable and the result corroborates the descriptive results of 
Table 4. It suggests that there is much potential to gain in scale efficiencies for the smallest firms. However, 
the differences between the estimates of other size classes and size class 2 are very small and not significant 
different from zero, as can be inferred from the P-value of the 2χ  test statistics, which for all differences 
with respect to size class 2 exceeds its critical value of 0.05. Apart from the standard errors of the estimates 
the correlation between the errors of the estimates are also taken into account in the Wald test. The table 
also shows that size class 5 ( 250 employed persons) has a lower scale efficiency than size class 3 (20 – 49 
employed persons) and size class 4 (50 – 249 employed persons). Thus the pattern of scale inefficiencies is 
bending back after size class 3. Taken on the whole these test results indicate that the most efficient scale is 

close to 20 employees and that scale inefficiencies show a hump shape pattern with strong potential scale 
economies for the smallest firms and diseconomies of scale for the largest firms
Table 8     Testing of differences between scale efficiencies of size classes
SCE in Table 6, 
column 3
SCE in Table 7,        
column 1
SCE in Table 7,     
column 3
Estim. P value Estim. P value Estim. P value 
a) b) a) b) a) b)
Differences by pair of size classes:
Size class 2 - Size class 1 c) 0.62 0.00 c) 0.72 0.00 c) 0.70 0.00 c)
Size class 3 - Size class 2 0.03 0.21 0.04 0.31 0.03 0.44
Size class 4 - Size class 2 0.03 0.25 0.04 0.28 0.02 0.60
Size class 5 - Size class 2 -0.06 0.05 -0.05 0.19 -0.10 0.02
Size class 4 - Size class 3 0.00 0.95 0.01 0.90 -0.01 0.83
Size class 5 - Size class 3 -0.09 0.00 -0.09 0.02 -0.12 0.00
Size class 5 - Size class 4 -0.09 0.00 -0.09 0.01 -0.12 0.00 
a) Differences between estimates size class dummies RE Tobit models; b) P-value of 2(1) test of equality of size dummy 
estimates. A P-value > 0.05 leads to accepting the null that size dummies are equal; c) P-value gives marginal significance 
of difference between estimate size class dummy 2 and estimate for reference group (size class 1).  Source: own 
calculations.
.
6. Conclusions
We have investigated structural determinants of this labour productivity performance focussing on scale 
inefficiency, imperfect entry-exit selection, and regulatory barriers that hamper resource allocation to the 
most efficient firms. These issues have been investigated with a parametric global stochastic frontier (GSF) 
model, complemented with non-parametric data-envelopment analysis (DEA) as a robustness check and as a 
method for further exploring scale efficiencies. Having established industry-wise productivity frontier on the 
basis of a large dataset for 13 EU countries, we have for all observations calculated the distance to the 
productivity frontier and the incidence of scale inefficiencies. Subsequently we applied a Tobit panel 
estimator method to test whether market structure and national regulatory differences explain the resulting 
indicators for X-efficiency and scale efficiency. 
The estimates reveal the following. The smallest size class (1-9 workers) represents more than 90 
per cent of all business services firms in the EU and about one-third of total employment. This size class is 
very competitive, its firms on average have tiny market shares and firms within this size class tend to use
similar technologies (small X-inefficiencies). However, this size class as a whole displays a huge scale 
inefficiency compared to the most efficient size class (50-249 workers). This scale inefficiency is persistent 
over time and points to weak competitive selection. Market and regulation characteristics explain the 
persistence of X-inefficiency (sub-optimal productivity relative to the industry frontier). More entry and 
exit are favourable for productivity performance, while higher market concentration works out negatively. 

Regulatory differences also appear to explain part of the business services' productivity performance. In 
particular regulation-caused exit costs (closing down a firm) have a significant and large negative impact on 
the process of competitive selection and hence on productivity performance. To a lesser degree also 
regulation-caused inflexibility in labour reallocation lowers the productivity performance. We found no 
significant impact from policies with regard to starting up a new business. Overall we find that the most 
efficient scale in business services is close to 20 employees and that scale inefficiencies show a hump-
shape pattern with strong potential scale economies for the smallest firms and diseconomies of scale for the 
largest firms. The smallest firms operate under competitive conditions, but they are too small to be 
efficient. And since this conclusion holds for about 95 out of every 100 European business services firms, 
this factor weighs heavily for the overall productivity performance of this industry.  
Despite strong growth in terms of production and employment, the productivity growth track 
record of the European Union (EU) of business services industry has been bleak since many years. Policy 
makers have repeatedly expressed concerns about the stagnating growth of productivity in the business 
services industry (European Commission 2003), because of this industry's role as supplier of intermediary 
inputs and because of its key role in outsourcing. Our results suggest that future policies should give more 
weight to measures that facilitate firm growth to at least a size of 20 employed persons, and secondly to 
lower regulation-caused obstacles to reallocate labour and close inefficient firms. Both measures may have 
substantial positive effects for the productivity performance of EU business services. 
ANNEXES
Annex 1   The representative firm by 'data cell'
A.  Firm distribution between and within data cells. 
Our data consist of constructed 'average firms' for each combination of 5 size classes, 8 sub-sectors and 13 
countries in the cross-sectional dimension. We do not have specific information on the distribution of 
firms within each data cell (size class by sub-sector by country). Nonetheless our ‘average’ observations 
can be considered as representative firms for each data cell, using a discovery by Axtell (2001, 2006) from 
a statistical study on the size distribution of all U.S. business firms in 1997. On the basis of firm-level data 
he found that the distribution of firm-sizes over the total population closely follows the Pareto distribution 
with a shape parameter very near unity, which is often called the Zipf distribution. In the tail of the 
cumulative density function it holds that the probability that firm i's employment size λi is smaller than 
some arbitrary size limit Λ is equal to:
(A1) 
with λo  being the minimum firm size and α the shape parameter of the distribution. For firms the 
minimum size is one employed person. Axtell found that for US business the shape parameter (α) had the 
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value of 1.059. This implies that the relation between the log of frequency and the log of firm size can be 
described as a straight downward-sloping line, i.e. the distribution is extremely skew. This result appeared 
to be robust when using other firm-size measures such as turnover (Axtell 2001, 2006). The Eurostat data 
on the EU business services include the total numbers of firms in each size class, thus allowing to 
implement the same test on firm-size distribution properties that Axtell did. The first test aggregates the 
data for all sub-sectors of business services and 11 EU countries in 1999. The result −shown in 
Figure A1−  is remarkably similar to Axtell’s outcomes. The estimated α in our case is even closer to 
unity: 1.055 which implies that the size distribution is “Zipfian”.11
An important property of the Zipf-type Pareto distribution is that it is self-similar like a fractal, i.e. 
the distribution within size classes is similar to that prevailing over the entire size range. When we know 
the 'average' firm within a size class we indirectly know how this 'average' firm fits into the full intra-size 
class distribution of firms. The cumulative density function of each individual size class j with support 
[MINj , MAXj ]  then has a similar property:
(A2) 
with λi,j  being the size of “average” firm i  in size class j (cf. Johnson et al. 1994: 208; Axtell 2006). The 
implication of property (A2) is that once we have identified the “average” firm λi,j we also have some 
information on the firms that within the size class distribution are located at the left and right of firm λi,j.  
Figure A1      Size distribution of EU business services firms in 1999 (Eurostat data), log-log 
scale, size measured by number of employed persons
11
  The Gini coefficient with support [0,1] is calculated as [ 2α - 1]-1 and amounts to 0.9009, which confirms the very 
skewed character of the distribution. 
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With respect to scale effects, this property allows to derive in a stochastic sense some conclusions on a 
marginal change of firm size, so that standard scale analysis can be applied with regard to our dataset.
B.  Representative firms and accuracy of the DEA method. 
The fact that we do not have data available on to real firms or economic agents (in DEA terminology: 
Decision Making Units or DMU’s) could introduce measurement error or parameter uncertainty. It is 
difficult to assess a priori what is the influence on the goodness of DEA estimates in general. 
Recent advances in stochastic DEA approaches show that traditional DEA remains valid if the 
evaluator is risk neutral with respect to parameter uncertainty (e.g. Post 1999). Hence, the traditional DEA 
framework may serve as a benchmark for environments involving disturbances. A basic assumption for 
employing DEA is that the data form part of the production possibility set. We think it plausible to assume 
that this requirement is met by using average values for inputs and outputs, taking into account that the 
boundaries of the production possibility set are also determined by minimum and maximum values. The 
latter point clarifies why DEA results can be sensitive to the selection of DMU’s. In real micro economic 
data, there is no guarantee of selecting the full production possibility set, especially not if the data are 
drawn from samples. But sample averages are by definition lying within the production possibility set! A 
further issue concerns the precise measurement of inputs and outputs. More formally, we can employ the 
following structure for the input-output estimates:
x
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wXX
wYY
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+=
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(A3)
with Yˆ  and Xˆ  being estimates of true values for output (Y) and input (X). If these estimates are used 
rather than the true values, then selecting a reference unit (i.e. calculating the relevant comparison point on 
the frontier for each data point) becomes a problem of choice under uncertainty. In our data this 
uncertainty can be thought of as a set of overlapping circles drawn around the average values, with the ray 
of the circles representing the variance of the measurement errors w.  
However, as holds for many problems of choice under uncertainty, this problem cannot be 
solved without making further assumptions regarding the distribution of the estimation errors. The most 
general forms of the theory of stochastic dominance (SD) show that traditional DEA remains applicable if 
the errors are random and mutually independent. Moreover, in our data we use sample averages so that the 
covariance matrices for w are given by the 1/N multiples of the covariance matrices of the disturbances. 
Hence, the influence of measurement error seems not to play an important role in our data. 
	
Annex 2    Correlation matrix for regulation indicators used 
Overall Cost of 
Doing Business 
Starting a 
Business
Closing a    
Business
Employment 
Flexibility
Overall Cost of Doing Business 1.000
Starting a Business 0.860 1.000
Closing a Business 0.376 0.187 1.000
Employment Flexibility 0.783 0.592 -0.010 1.000

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